INTRODUCTION
Arizona' established the high water mark of the protections afforded an accused during a custodial interrogation. During the decades that followed, the United States Supreme Court allowed Miranda's foundation to erode, inviting a direct challenge to the landmark ruling. In Dickerson v. United States, the Court turned back such a challenge and placed Miranda upon a more secure, constitutional footing. This Article explores the impact of Dickerson in the place where Miranda was meant to matter most: the stationhouse.
As I have described elsewhere, Supreme Court decisions have influenced a number of California law enforcement agencies to instruct officers that they may continue to interrogate suspects in custody who have asserted their Fifth Amendment right to remain silent or right to counsel. 3 Harris v. New York' and Oregon v. Hass 5 permit some statements taken in violation of Miranda to be used for impeachment purposes at trial. Michigan v. Tucker 6 and Oregon v. Elstad 7 permit some derivative use of such statements.' These rulings -together with other decisions labeling Miranda's procedures as merely "prophylactic" 9 -have created incentives for police to disregard Miranda and have led to a different way of thinking about its core holding. Proponents of this different view, which I have called the "new vision" of Miranda,"° have claimed that Miranda sets forth a nonconstitutional rule of evidence that need only be followed when officers seek a statement to introduce in the prosecution's case-in-chief at trial." By transforming Miranda from an affirmative constitutional command governing conduct in the stationhouse into a weak rule of evidence, the new vision has encouraged officers to continue to question suspects who have asserted the right to counsel or the right to remain silent. During the last decade, the practice has become so pervasive in some jurisdictions that it has acquired its own moniker: questioning "outside Miranda.' 2 This Article argues that Dickerson firmly rejects the "new vision" and asks whether the ruling may foster new respect for Miranda and adherence to its commands. The Article explores the Court's reaffirmation of the constitutional basis for Miranda and discusses the efficacy of exclusionary rules and civil rights actions in enforcing Miranda's procedures. Most police officers are not lawyers and do not read advance sheets. Court decisions can influence officers' conduct only if the holdings are accurately transmitted to them. This Article thus examines how law enforcement officials are instructed following Dickerson and other recent Miranda cases, and explores whether officers are likely to follow their training.
Part I briefly reviews interrogation training in the last decade, particularly in California, and discusses the holdings in Dickerson and three other recent Miranda decisions from lower courts, including one civil rights action. Part II examines the instruction of officers in California in the wake of these cases. Although the training is not uniform, and may not be given in all parts of California, officers are now being encouraged to comply with Miranda. It appears to have taken a palpable threat of civil liability and, perhaps, Dickerson to force this change. Part III discusses the conditions under which the new training may actually alter interrogation practices in the stationhouse. The Article argues that the new training may prove effective if law en-8. In Tucker, the Court declined to suppress the testimony of a trial witness whose identity was discovered through a statement in violation of Miranda. 417 U.S. at 450. In Elstad, the Court ruled that a statement given after proper warnings would not be suppressed as the fruit of an earlier unwarned statement. 470 U.S. at 309.
9. E.g., Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203 (1989) ; Tucker, 417 U.S. at 446.
10. Weisselberg, supra note 3, at 132.
11 12. See id. at 133-37.
The instruction has also occurred in counties and cities within California, though it is also true that some agencies have rejected the practice and have told officers to respect a suspect's Miranda invocation. 18 Despite the efforts of some agencies to urge respect for Miranda, "outside Miranda" training has had a significant impact in California, as demonstrated by the reported cases with "outside Miranda" issues. 9 This training has led to several legislative efforts at reform, which have not yet proved successful. 0 "Outside Miranda" instruction emphasizes that Miranda describes only a value-neutral rule of evidence; it does not embody a constitutional command. Thus, there is nothing legally or morally wrong in interrogating a suspect who has invoked the right to counsel or the right to remain silent. Questioning over an invocation merely has an evidentiary consequence at trial. 21 It is therefore perfectly legitimate to ques-16. See Weisselberg, supra note 3, at 133-37. In Tucker, the Court called Miranda's safeguards "recommended" and "suggested," though it is clear from the context that the Court did not mean that Miranda's procedures could be unilaterally scrapped. See Tucker, 417 U.S. at 443-44. 17. See Weisselberg, supra note 3, at 133-34. POST is part of the California Department of Justice. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 13500 (2000) . It develops training programs and standards for law enforcement officers. See CAL. PENAL CODE § § 13503(e) (2000) , 13510(a) (2000 & Supp. 2001 ), 13511 (2000 & Supp. 2001 ).
See infra Section II.C.
19. See infra Section I.B; see also Weisselberg, supra note 3, at 136-37. There are no empirical studies showing the prevalence of this practice in police departments throughout California. In 1992-93, however, Richard Leo observed 182 interrogations conducted by police in three northern California departments. Suspects invoked their rights in thirty-eight interrogations. Officers continued to question "outside Miranda" in seven of those thirtyeight cases (18%). See Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 266, 276 (1996) . 20. In 1999, a bill was introduced in the California State Assembly declaring "the intent of the Legislature" that officers cease questioning a suspect in custody who has invoked his or her Miranda rights. A.B. 1326 -2000 Reg. Sess. (Cal., as amended Jan. 14, 2000 . The bill was voted out of committee but died while Dickerson was pending in the Supreme Court. On March 19, 2001 , another bill was introduced in the California State Senate with the same declaration, but also with a provision to prohibit "outside Miranda" training. See S. B. 1211 , 2001 -02 Reg. Sess. (Cal., as amended May 15, 2001 . The bills and their histories are available at http://www.assembly.ca.gov/acs/acsframeset2text.htm (last visited May 29, 2001 ).
21.
See, e.g., CAL. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CALIFORNIA PEACE OFFICERS LEGAL SOURCEBOOK § 7.40a (Rev. Mar. 1997) [ hereinafter SOURCEBOOK] (on file with author) ("An uncoerced (voluntary) statement obtained 'outside' Miranda (without complying with Miranda) may not be used during trial as part of the prosecutor's case-in-chief.... However, it can be used during the 'rebuttal' portion of the trial to impeach a defendant .. "); id., § 7.40b ("[T] he Miranda decision is not a code of conduct setting forth how police must conduct their investigations in the field.... Rather, the Miranda opinion simply sets out a 'series of recommended "procedural safeguards"....' ") (quoting Tucker, 417 U.S. at 443-44); Videotape: Questioning: "Outside Miranda" (Greg Gulen Productions 1990), transcript re-tion a suspect even after she has asserted her Fifth Amendment rights, to obtain additional information (such as the location of physical evidence, the names of witnesses, the identities of accomplices, or the accused's methods of operation) or to force the defendant to commit to a statement that will prevent her from asserting a new defense at trial. Of course, any such statement cannot itself be used in the case-in-chief at trial. But, in the words of a proponent of this tactic, "you can accomplish all of these legitimate purposes that don't have anything to do with the prosecution of the case, and some that do, by talking to the guy 'outside Miranda.' "2 Officers trained in this fashion perceive no downside to questioning "outside Miranda." Investigators who respect an invocation of a suspect's rights and stop questioning will obtain no information from a suspect. On the other hand, questioning over an invocation may yield useful information, even if that information has a limited use at trial. I have argued elsewhere that this theory and training is not faithful to the language, history, or purposes of Miranda. 23 Nor does it cohere with Edwards v. Arizona,4 which holds that an accused who has "expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel ... is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him" unless the suspect reinitiates contact or communication with the officers. 5 A significant number of law enforcement trainers, however, have not read Miranda or Edwards to bar such continued questioning. 26 printed in Weisselberg, supra note 3, at 191:
The Miranda exclusionary rule is limited to the defendant's own statement out of his mouth. That is all that is excluded under Miranda. It doesn't have a fruits of the poisonous tree theory attached to it the way constitutional violations do. When you violate Miranda, you're not violating the Constitution. Miranda is not in the Constitution. It's a court-created decision that affects the admissibility of testimonial evidence and that's all it is. So you don't violate any law. There's no law says [sic] you can't question people "outside Miranda." You don't violate the Constitution. The Constitution doesn't say you have to do that. It's a court decision. So all you're violating is a court decision controlling admissibility of evidence. So you're not doing anything unlawful, you're not doing anything illegal, you're not violating anybody's civil rights, you're doing nothing improper. The only consequence of your talking to somebody who has invoked his rights is 'we will not be able to use his statement in the case in chief in trial against him.
22. See id. at 192. 23. See Weisselberg, supra note 3, at 122-25, 140-53, 162-67. 24. 451 U.S. 477 (1981) .
25.
Id. at 484-85; see also Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 153 (1990) Miranda, holding that "[p] olice officers are presented with a choicethey may cease questioning upon defendant's invocation of the right to remain silent or they may continue their discussion with the suspect and therefore lose the benefit of that evidence in the prosecution's case-in-chief.
"30
The question reached the California Supreme Court in 1998 in People v. Peevy. 3 1 Airreque Peevy was arrested for attempted robbery 27. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398 (1978) .
28. See, e.g., In re Gilbert E., 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 866, 868 (Ct. App. 1995) ("When the police deliberately step over the line and disobey Supreme Court pronouncements, respect for the rule of law necessarily diminishes."); People v. Bey, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 28, 30-31 (Ct. App. 1993 ) ("This is a very troubling case, presenting a deliberate police violation of Miranda coupled with a misrepresentation to appellant about the legal consequences of that violation."); People v. Montano, 277 Cal. Rptr. 327, 337 (Ct. App. 1991 ) ("No tolerance can be given to the officers' flagrant trampling of defendant's rights, particularly because [officers] began the interrogation with no intention of respecting those rights." (footnote omitted)); People v. Baker, 269 Cal. Rptr. 475, 478 (Ct. App. 1990 ) ("Fortunately, the trial court here was well aware of the unlawfulness of the police conduct and stated that it intended to initiate steps to prohibit the San Diego Police Department from using ["outside Miranda"] procedures in the future.").
29. 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 773 (Ct. App. 1998 ), depublished, 1998 Cal. LEXIS 4252 (June 24, 1998 ). 30. Id. at 778. 31. 953 P.2d 1212 (Cal. 1998 ), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1042 . In a death penalty case decided a year earlier, the California Supreme Court noted that officers had questioned the defendant after his request for counsel. See People v. Bradford, 929 P.2d 544 (Cal. 1997) . The court criticized the officers, stating that their conduct "was unethical and it is strongly disapproved." Id. at 567.
by San Bernardino County sheriff's deputies, who questioned him after he asked for an attorney. 32 One deputy testified that "I kept talking with him for impeachment purposes." 3 3 Peevy's "outside Miranda" statement was later used to impeach him at trial. 34 On May 7, 1998, the California Supreme Court unanimously ruled that the Harris exception applies even when a statement is taken in deliberate violation of Miranda and Edwards." Peevy did not assert that his statement was involuntary; consequently, that issue was not addressed. 3 6 The court also left open the question whether a statement would still be admissible for impeachment if there was proof of a widespread practice on the part of the police to ignore a Miranda invocation. 37 Though Peevy permits the impeachment use of a statement taken deliberately "outside Miranda," all seven justices also unequivocally rejected the claim that Miranda and Edwards merely establish a valueneutral rule of evidence that may be disregarded at an officer's election. Those cases impose "an affirmative duty upon interrogating officers to cease questioning once a suspect invokes the right to counsel.... Nothing in the language of Harris or Oregon v. Hass, for example, suggests that the court now considers the Miranda or Edwards rules as constituting mere advice regarding preferred police conduct." 38 The court declared that a statement is excluded under Miranda and Edwards because "the evidence was obtained illegally" 39 and described questioning after an invocation as "police misconduct." 4° Soon thereafter, the justices also "depublished" Branscombe, removing its ability to serve as precedent. 41 Peevy filed a petition for writ of certiorari. In its response, the California Attorney General asked the U.S. Supreme Court to take 32. See Peevy, 953 P.2d 41. People v. Branscombe, 1998 Cal. LEXIS 4252 (June 24, 1998 ). An unpublished opinion "shall not be cited or relied on by a court or a party." CAL. R. CT. 977(a). the case and "once and for all clarify that non-coercive noncompliance with Miranda does not constitute 'illegal' or 'unlawful' conduct. 4 2 On December 7, 1998, the Court denied the petition. 3 Peevy contains an unambiguous statement from California's highest court, decrying the practice of questioning over a Miranda invocation. But the overall message to officers was muddied. By holding that statements taken in deliberate violation of Miranda are still admissible for impeachment, the court left wholly intact the incentive for officers to continue to violate Miranda and, perhaps, gave the impression that state courts would be willing to look the other way.
Henry v. Kernan
As one might also expect, issues about these interrogation practices eventually reached the federal circuit court. On May 26, 1999, the court of appeals decided Henry v. Kernan," reversing the denial of a habeas corpus petition in a second-degree murder case. Henry was interrogated by Sacramento County sheriff's deputies after he asked for counsel. Shaken, confused and frightened, he gave a rambling and disjointed statement, which was used to impeach him at trial. 45 In granting relief, the Ninth Circuit noted that the officers' refusal to honor Henry's invocation "was designed to generate a feeling of helplessness," and "it was successful." 46 The court concluded that "the slippery and illegal tactics" of the officers overcame Henry's will and made his statements involuntary and thus inadmissible for any purpose. 47 In addition to questioning after his invocation of the right to counsel, one of the deputies misled Henry about the effect of a statement, saying that "what you tell us we can't use against you right now.... We'd just would like to know." 48 The State sought rehearing in Henry, arguing that Henry's statements were voluntary up to the point that the misleading assurances were given. Denying rehearing, the court strengthened its opinion, 42 . Response to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 12, Peevy v. California (No. 98-6125) (Nov. 6, 1998) . Professor Paul G. Cassell and the Washington Legal Foundation also asked the Supreme Court to take the case, stating that " [a] mici are deeply concerned that the conclusion below about the 'illegality' of noncoercive questioning outside of the Miranda rules will unnecessarily discourage police officers from questioning suspects .. " Brief of Amici Curiae Washington Legal Foundation et al. at 2, (Nov. 12, 1998) .
43. Peevy v. California, 525 U.S. 1042 Justice v. Butts 51 were two associations of criminal defense lawyers and two individuals who had been questioned in violation of Miranda and Edwards. Both individual plaintiffs were interrogated after they unequivocally sought counsel. In April 1996, the federal district court dismissed the portion of the case brought by the two bar associations, finding that they lacked standing to seek injunctive relief. 2 The court permitted the case to go forward on behalf of the two individual plaintiffs, rejecting the defendants' claim that Harris permits officers to question "outside Miranda" to obtain impeachment information. 3 The case subsequently went to the court of appeals on the officers' interlocutory appeal from the denial of qualified immunity. 4 49. Id. The court also emphasized that under the California Evidence Code, statements admitted for impeachment are also admitted for the truth of the matters asserted. Id. (citing CAL. EVID. CODE § § 1220,1235 (Oct. 16, 1997) . In so ruling, the court reaffirmed its previous denial of qualified immunity to the defendant officers. See Order re: Cross Motions for Summary Judgment, supra, at 5.
11.29
March 20011 HeinOnline --99 Mich. L. Rev. 1129 [2000] [2001] On November 8, 1999, the court of appeals affirmed the denial of qualified immunity. 5 The court determined that the plaintiffs had alleged constitutional claims. Although "[i]n the narrowest sense" Miranda "is a prophylactic rule, not a constitutional right," Miranda "cannot be viewed entirely apart from the constitutional rights that it protects." 6 Moreover, while under circuit authority a bare violation of Miranda may not be enough to establish a § 1983 action, the two plaintiffs additionally alleged that officers made assurances that the plaintiffs' statements could not be used against them and, in one case, denigrated the role of counsel. 7 The court also ruled that the constitutional right was clearly established and that reasonable officers should have known that their actions violated the plaintiffs ' Miranda rights. 8 Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220 , 1244 (9th Cir. 1992 ) (en banc), where a § 1983 action was permitted to go forward on behalf of a former suspect who was questioned in violation of Miranda and subjected to abusive tactics. The Cooper court noted that "[tihis case does not establish a cause of action where police officers continue to talk to a suspect after he asserts his rights and where they do so in a benign Way." Id. By ruling that the claim should go to trial in Butts, the court determined that the plaintiffs had at least alleged that the questioning "outside Miranda" was not "benign."
58. See Butts, 195 F.3d at 1047 . 59. Id. at 1048 . 60. See id. at 1049 hat Los Angeles and Santa Monica may have trained their police to violate the rights of individuals does not provide any defense for these officers. Their policy contradicts the safeguards provided by Miranda, and, at the very least, is in direct conflict with Cooper [v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220 (9th Cir. 1992 The statute also provides that the judge shall consider a variety of factors to determine voluntariness, including whether or not the accused was advised of the right to remain silent and the right to the assistance of counsel. 4 Though these circumstances are to be taken into consideration, they "need not be conclusive., 6 5 In this respect, the statute sought to replace Miranda, which makes its regime of warnings and waiver conclusive, at least as to the admissibility of a statement in the case-in-chief.
The statute lay fallow for years, for the most part unenforced by the Department of Justice and ignored by the courts.' In February The trial judge in determining the issue of voluntariness shall take into consideration all the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession, including (1) the time elapsing between arrest and arraignment of the defendant making the confession, if it was made after arrest and before arraignment, (2) whether such defendant knew the nature of the offense with which he was charged or of which he was suspected at the time of making the confession, (3) whether or not such defendant was advised or knew that he was not required to make any statement and that any such statement could be used against him, (4) whether or not such defendant had been advised prior to questioning of his right to the assistance of counsel; and (5) whether or not such defendant was without the assistance of counsel when questioned and when giving such confession. The presence or absence of any of the above-mentioned factors to be taken into consideration by the judge need not be conclusive on the issue of voluntariness of the confession. Conceding "that there is some language in some of our opinions that supports the view," the justices disagreed with the court of appeals' conclusion that Miranda's protections are not constitutionally required. 7 Addressing the "public safety" and impeachment exceptions described in New York v. Quarles 72 and Harris v. New York, the majority claimed that " [t] hese decisions illustrate the principle -not that Miranda is not a constitutional rule -but that no constitutional rule is immutable." 73 Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented, tearing at the majority for "its carefully couched iterations that 'Miranda is a constitutional decision,' that 'Miranda is constitutionallybased, ' [and] that Miranda has 'constitutional underpinnings.' "" According to Justice Scalia, the Court fell short of stating that an unwarned custodial interrogation violates the Constitution "because a majority of the Court does not believe it," perhaps suggesting that the majority was disingenuous in its internal reasoning. 75 He accused the Court of engaging in extraconstitutional "power-judging." 76 67. See United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999 75. Id; see also id. at 2343 (asserting that the Court did not address the claim that Miranda establishes a constitutional prophylactic rule "because, I assume, a majority of the Justices intent on reversing believes that incoherence is the lesser evil").
Id. at 2337.
The dissenters have something of a point: The majority could have held that a violation of Miranda is a per se violation of the Fifth Amendment. But such a ruling would have required the Court to deal more directly with the impeachment and public safety exception cases, which are premised at least in part on the notion that a Miranda violation is not a core constitutional violation. The majority also attempted to distinguish Oregon v. Elstad," which refused to exclude the testimonial fruit of a Miranda violation, claiming that "[ojur decision in that case ... does not prove that Miranda is a nonconstitutional decision, but simply recognizes the fact that unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment are different from unwarned interrogation under the Fifth Amendment." 78 This is fairly unsatisfying, inasmuch as the fruits doctrine applies to other types of Fifth Amendment transgressions 79 and probably to Fourteenth Amendment violations as well;' moreover, the majority in Elstad said that Miranda's exclusionary rule "may be triggered even in the absence of a Fifth Amendment violation."" 1 Further, the Court has created a weaker rule of exclusion for statements taken in violation of Miranda than for other types of compelled testimony and for statements that violate the Fourteenth Amendment. 82 For that reason, concluding that breaches of Miranda 80. The Supreme Court has apparently never directly faced the question whether the fruits of an involuntary statement must be excluded, though it has come close. In Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398 (1978) , the Court declared that "any criminal trial use against a defendant of his involuntary statement is a denial of due process of law." In Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 300 (1991) , the Court found that the use of an involuntary statement harmed the defendant for several reasons, including that it made other highlydamaging evidence relevant and, thus, admissible. For a discussion of the reasons why the fruits doctrine should apply to Fourteenth Amendment violations, see Yale Kamisar, On the "Fruits" of Miranda Violations, Coerced Confessions, and Compelled Testimony, 93 MICH. L. REV. 929 (1995 83 These must have appeared unhappy choices for the Dickerson majority, which also sought to rest its ruling on principles of stare decisis. 4 Even so, Dickerson should put to rest the claim that Miranda's procedures are merely nonconstitutional suggested guidelines, as hinted in Tucker and as a number of law enforcement instructors have told police. "Congress," the Court held, may "set aside any judicially created rules of evidence and procedure that are not required by the Constitution." 5 That Congress lacked such authority in this case can mean only that Miranda's procedures are indeed required by the Constitution. Further, "[t]he Miranda opinion itself begins by stating that the Court granted certiorari 'to explore some facets of the problems.., of applying the privilege against self-incrimination to incustody interrogation, and to give concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow.' "86 "Concrete constitutional guidelines" are more than mere non-constitutional suggestions. Dickerson's message to law enforcement is that Miranda's rules are here to stay. 84. See Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326 , 2336 (2000 .
85
. Id. at 2332.
86.
Id. at 2333-34 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 441-42 (1966) (emphasis added in Dickerson)).
II. RECENT POLICE TRAINING

A. Uncovering Police Practices
To assess whether these recent decisions -especially Dickerson -may influence police practices in California, I examined on-the-job ("in-service") law enforcement training materials. Most police officers are not lawyers and they do not usually read legal newspapers; thus, judicial opinions will not have an impact in the stationhouse unless sworn personnel are formally instructed about them. Supporting this view, two studies of police and the Fourth Amendment report that inservice training makes the most significant contribution to officers' understanding of search and seizure law. 87 Of course, knowledge is not the same as practice. Training materials will not alter police behavior in the stationhouse unless officers decide to follow them. 88 Training is thus necessary though not sufficient to alter law enforcement behavior.
In Section B, infra, describes the training materials issued by POST and other statewide entities. I believe that I have obtained a fairly comprehensive set of materials distributed by state agencies and statewide organizations, and can therefore safely draw conclusions about the effect of Dickerson and other cases upon statewide training. The materials collected from local agencies are less comprehensive. Section C, infra, describes instruction in select counties and cities.
B. Statewide Training 1. Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training
The Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training ("POST"), part of the California Department of Justice, is the most active statewide training body for police officers and deputy sheriffs. POST approves standard curricula for new officer instruction, and certifies in-service or advanced officer training. POST also conducts a monthly satellite video broadcast with case law updates, and the broadcast is downloaded by law enforcement agencies across the state. 94 90. CAL. GOV'T CODE § § 6250-6268 (1995 § § 6250-6268 ( & Supp. 2001 .
91. Felonies are generally prosecuted by the county district attorneys' offices. See CAL. GOv'T CODE § 26500 (1988 & Supp. 2001 . The Sheriff's departments are county-wide law enforcement agencies. District attorneys and sheriffs are elected in each county. See CAL. GOv'T CODE § § 24000, 24009(a) (1988 § § 24000, 24009(a) ( & Supp. 2001 . Most cities in California have their own police departments, each headed by an appointed chief, though some incorporated and all unincorporated areas rely upon the county sheriff for local law enforcement. See CAL. GoV'T CODE § § 36501, 36505 (1988 § § 36501, 36505 ( & Supp. 2001 It is difficult to overemphasize the impact of POST. Even if many officers in an agency do not see the POST materials directly, they are usually trained by people who do. Moreover, most detectives and investigators -who ordinarily conduct the custodial interrogations in serious cases -have received advanced interrogation training in POST-approved courses." Many of these courses are provided by trainers outside of the officers' own departments, who may be unfamiliar with local policies and practices. Thus, even if a local law enforcement agency has a policy of strict compliance with Miranda, detectives and other investigators may receive advanced instruction from people operating under a different set of guidelines.
POST's monthly satellite broadcasts have addressed the recent Miranda cases. POST's July 1998 broadcast included a segment on the impeachment exception and Peevy.
9 6 The segment reviews Harris, Hass, and Branscombe (the depublished decision) 9 7 before turning to Peevy. The trainer, a deputy district attorney, reports that a statement "is perfectly admissible even though the police officer deliberately took it for purposes of impeachment." He then warns that it cannot be used for any purpose if it is rendered involuntary by the interrogator "assuring the person that it will be off the record and cannot be used against them in court." 98 He adds: Another caution. You see sometimes the newscasters giving you the news and then they want to give you their opinion about that. They want to add something that's not the facts, it's just their commentary. And so down at the bottom of the screen it says, opinion or commentary. When a court does that they call it dicta. They've got their ruling, which might be the news, and then they've got their commentary, which is called dicta. It means this is not binding on anybody. This is not a statement of the law. This is just us expressing our personal opinions about something. In Parts B and C of their opinion in Peevy, the California Supreme Court expressed its displeasure with the tactic of questioning outside Miranda in order to obtain an impeachment statement. they don't approve of it. They thought in their opinion that it was illegal, they said. That's the word that they used, though they were unable to cite to a U.S. Supreme Court case, since there isn't one, saying that it's illegal. The U.S. Supreme Court has consistently said this is an evidentiary rule that will limit use of the statement in court. They have never said it is illegal to question without Miranda compliance. Nor, I will bet my money, will they ever. But the California Supreme Court in its commentary, in its dicta said, this is illegal, it's improper. So before you decide whether or not you want to go outside Miranda and take an impeachment statement that will be admissible if it's otherwise voluntary, you may want to do what we always caution you to do, seek advice from your departmental legal adviser, local prosecutor, city attorney or county counsel, whoever you turn to for advice. I commend you to their advice. As to the admissibility of the evidence, a statement deliberately taken outside Miranda, if it's otherwise voluntary, is admissible for impeachment, People v. Peevy. You're up-to-date as of now. 99 POST broadcast another segment after the Fourth Circuit's ruling in Dickerson. 1°° The trainer emphasizes that Miranda establishes a prophylactic rule, not rights protected by the Constitution, and that if Miranda can be preempted by a statute in the federal courts, "it could be done state by state by state." ' 01 After the ruling in Henry v. Kernan, POST broadcast a segment warning officers about tactics that may lead to an involuntary statement. 2 In this segment, the trainer, a different prosecutor than that featured in the two other broadcasts, underscores that repeated Miranda violations may amount to badgering and may prevent a statement from being used for any purpose. In contrast to the earlier broadcasts, he expressly tells officers not to question in violation of Miranda: "It isn't worth it. It isn't worth your reputation or the reputation of your department -much less the potential civil rights liability under 42 U.S. Code 1983 -to willfully violate Miranda."" 1 3 Yet another broadcast was issued after the Ninth Circuit's decision in Butts, featuring the same deputy district attorney who appeared in the videos on As of March 2001, POST has not broadcast a segment on the Supreme Court's ruling in Dickerson.°7
As noted, POST also certifies law enforcement training programs.°8 In the wake of Dickerson, POST's executive director issued a memorandum to all "POST Certified Training Presenters," emphasizing respect for Miranda and stating that POST's policy is that no officer shall continue to interrogate a suspect over a Miranda invocation."
9 The director's message, however, was undone by a sentence in the last part of his memorandum: "Procedures related to the 'impeachment' exception are a matter of local policy and are referred to each independent agency for clarification. § § 13510.1, 13511.3, 13519.9 (2000) . how the hundreds of POST-certified trainers will instruct officers in light of this memorandum.
California Attorney General's Office
The California Department of Justice publishes the California Peace Officers Legal Sourcebook ("the Sourcebook"), which is widely used by prosecutors and police, including many law enforcement trainers. Portions of the Sourcebook were provided by a number of departments that responded to the request for training materials. The Sourcebook contains a section titled "Deliberately Ignoring an Invocation," which has been substantially revised in the wake of Peevy, Butts and Dickerson.
Prior to the Peevy decision, the Sourcebook opined that a voluntary "outside Miranda" statement should be admissible for impeachment, noting that "the Miranda decision is not a code of conduct setting forth how police must conduct their investigations in the field.." 1 After Peevy, the section was revised to explain that the California Supreme Court held that evidence taken in deliberate violation of Miranda could be used for impeachment. "2 The Sourcebook also references the part of the decision that calls such tactics "illegal," but questions this holding and characterizes it as dicta. 13 This section of the Sourcebook concludes that "[it may take a decision from the United States Supreme Court to finally settle this question and resolve the apparent conflict between the dicta in Peevy and federal law." ' 114 Another portion of the Sourcebook emphasizes that "nothing in the tablished in Miranda. Certified POST curriculum has always included a "respect" for the protections established in the Miranda decision and a prohibition against illegal or improper misconduct. As a result of the recent reaffirmation of the rights established in the Miranda decision, the following points need to be repeated as the Commission's policy:
*No officer shall intentionally violate Miranda by continuing to interrogate a suspect after they have invoked their right to counsel or to remain silent. *No officer shall engage in any conduct that can be concluded to be "coercive" including making false promises following the invocation of Miranda rights. Procedures related to the "impeachment" exception are a matter of local policy and are referred to each independent agency for clarification. The POST Commission is committed to compliance with the "spirit" as well as the letter of the Supreme Court's ruling.
Id.
111. SOURCEBOOK, supra note 21, § 7.40a-b (Rev. Mar. 1997).
112. See SOURCEBOOK, supra note 21, § 7.40a (Rev. July 1998) (on file with author) (noting that an "outside Miranda" statement "may be used to impeach the defendant regardless whether the police non-compliance with Miranda's procedures was negligent (accidental) or intentional"); id . § 7.48b ("[l] f you fail to comply with the Miranda guidelines in a non-coercive way, although any statement you obtain will be inadmissible at trial to prove guilt (i.e., in the prosecution's 'case-in-chief), that is the only 'penalty.' The statement will be admissible in rebuttal to impeach ... ; you can also use the statement for any other purpose.") (citations omitted).
113. See id. § 7.40b.
Miranda decision is constitutionally required," noting that "if you fail to comply with the Miranda guidelines in a non-coercive way, although any statement you obtain will be inadmissible at trial to prove guilt (i.e., in the prosecution's 'case-in-chief'), that is the only 'penalty. ' "115 Following the Ninth Circuit's decisions in Henry and Butts, the Attorney General's Office began to hedge. The Sourcebook notes that there were coercive aspects to the questioning in those cases but that Henry could also be read to hold that a deliberate violation of Miranda is itself a violation of the Fifth Amendment." 6 Further, the Sourcebook remarks that:
[R]eview by the United States Supreme Court will be sought in both Henry and Butts. In the meantime, however, it is understandable that many departments in this state have instructed their officers to strictly comply with Miranda's procedures, at least pending further developments, not the least of which will be the high court's upcoming decision in the Dickerson case. C. Local Training
District Attorneys' Offices
The county district attorneys' offices vary greatly in their Miranda training. For example, in the wake of the California Supreme Court's ruling in Peevy, the Los Angeles District Attorney's office issued a directive to all prosecutors and investigators, stating: "It is the policy of this office that deputy district attorneys shall not advise any law enforcement officer to continue to ask questions for the purpose of obtaining "impeachment" evidence after a suspect has invoked his impeachment. 12 9 The author opines that the result should be the same even if there were to be a proven policy of non-compliance with Miranda. 3 Obliquely referring to the portion of the Peevy opinion that calls such tactics "illegal" and "misconduct," the newsletter concludes:
In what a constitutional scholar from the Criminal Justice Legal
Foundation has charitably described as "unfortunate dictum," the Peevy court delivered itself of some additional statements of its understanding of the nature of Miranda ... that will be open to serious dispute if they should ever form the basis of a ruling. Meanwhile, like they say down home, "If you've caught the fish, don't fret about losing the bait.'
The training materials produced by the different county prosecutors are not easily categorized. The responses to the Public Records Act requests leave the overall impression that many county prosecutors have been quicker and more certain than their statewide counterparts in cautioning against questioning "outside Miranda," but instruction is not uniform among counties and, indeed, may not be consistent even within a single given county.
Two counties, Alameda and San Diego, have promulgated particularly extensive training materials, which appear to be widely distributed both inside and outside of those counties. It is worth describing their training documents in detail. Miranda: Part Two, at 15-16 (Spring 1993) [hereinafter POINT OF VIEW] ruling in Peevy was summarized in Point of View, emphasizing the connection between Miranda violations and involuntariness and noting that statements may be excluded for all purposes if taken pursuant to a policy of intentionally violating Miranda, but not discussing the portion of the decision that labels questioning "outside Miranda" "illegal" and "misconduct." ' 35 After the Ninth Circuit ruled in Henry v. Kernan, an article again stresses that "outside Miranda" questioning may make a statement involuntary. 1 3 6 Following the ruling in Butts, Point of View extensively discusses the case and concludes: "In light of this decision and others that have preceded it, there is only one thing to say about 'going outside Miranda': DON'T."' 37 Most recently, according to the District Attorney's Office, "Dickerson should put an end.. ." to questioning "outside Miranda" because the ruling rejects the claim "that Miranda was nothing more than a 'recommended procedure,' and was not a Constitutional requirement." ' 38 The Point of View videotapes, which are distributed to law enforcement agencies within the county, appear more receptive to the tactic of questioning "outside Miranda," at least up until the time of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Butts. A videotape on Peevy tells officers that a statement taken in deliberate violation of Miranda is admissible for impeachment, but does not describe Peevy's condemnation of such questioning. 39 Another videotape describes the holding in Branscombe, a case that was depublished two months before the video was produced. 4° That videotape mildly encourages officers to question over a Miranda invocation, noting that even if a statement will have only a limited use at trial, it "puts us in a better position" because (on file with author).
135. See POINT OF VIEW, supra note 134, People v. Bey, at 22 (Spring 1994 Henry and Dickerson at length and states that prosecutors should not advise officers to violate either the Constitution or the dictates of the state and federal courts. 5 2 The training outline provides that Dickerson is a reaffirmation of Miranda, "with the possible exception of an increased likelihood of civil liability for police officers (and prosecutors who advise intentional violations)."' 53 The District Attorney's Office regularly publishes a legal update for law enforcement agencies within San Diego County. 5 The issue after Peevy reviews the holding, and also acknowledges that the Court found that officers have an affirmative duty to cease questioning upon an invocation. 155 The update states that "[l]aw enforcement agencies should not be teaching or encouraging a 'systematic policy' of violating Miranda."' 5 6 The publication tells police about the circuit court ruling in Dickerson, advising that it has no direct effect here but may foreshadow change.' 57 The publication is critical of the ruling in Henry, arguing that the court improperly determined that a calculated plan to violate Miranda violates the Constitution.' 58 Following Butts, the District Attorney's Office noted that local law enforcement agencies are being encouraged by legal advisors to issue a directive not to question over an invocation. That directive is "overly broad" because officers can question over an invocation where several established exceptions apply.' 59 At the same time, the update provides that:
[U]nless you're working within one of the recognized exceptions to the Miranda requirement (e.g. "public safety exception" or "rescue doc- 
Sheriffs and Police Departments
County sheriffs' offices and city police departments are influenced by outside training materials. In response to the Public Records Act requests, many local law enforcement agencies disclosed or referred to statewide training materials (such as the Sourcebook or POST videos) as well as bulletins issued by district attorneys' offices. Training officers sometimes distribute these items directly to police. Sometimes they use them to create their own documents. Thus, even when detectives and patrol officers receive inservice instruction from trainers within their own departments, outside training materials are quite influential. And many departments send their officers to outside courses, thereby relinquishing control over the content of their officers' training.
Because the statewide instruction is not consistent, police departments that make use of these materials may fail to provide clear guidance to their officers. As an example, one police department in San Diego County gives the district attorney's legal updates to officers, but also requires them to view the POST videos.' 63 The legal updates are much more critical of questioning "outside Miranda" than the POST videos; thus, officers trained with both would not hear a consistent message.
Moreover, as already noted, detectives and investigators routinely attend advanced programs on interrogation and other topics that are conducted outside of their respective agencies. These programs may instruct on tactics that are contrary to the policies of the officers' home departments. This is illustrated by a broadcast issued by the Los Angeles County Sheriff to all deputies, pre-dating Peevy, stating, It has come to my attention that training provided by sources outside the department may have caused some deputies to believe that it is appropriate to continue to question a suspect in custody following an invocation of his or her rights under Miranda v. Arizona.... [M]embers of this department are expected to give Miranda warnings to a suspect prior to a custodial interrogation, and are expected to terminate that interrogation when a suspect invokes his or her rights.1
64
As an additional example of an agency's lack of control over out-ofhouse training, a law firm responding to the Public Records Act request on behalf of the Riverside Sheriff's Department wrote that:
The sources utilized by a law enforcement agency are too numerous to list or provide, and in most instances, the materials are not the property of the Riverside Sheriff's Department. In many instances, officers take classes at P.O.S.T. approved schools, learning from a P.O.S.T. approved curriculum, and the Department is not in possession of the course material.
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A number of county sheriffs and police chiefs have now issued formal directives, telling their officers not to question "outside Miranda." Some of these directives have come at the urging of private law firms that represent municipalities and are concerned about civil rights liability." 6 The orders from agency heads are different in kind from in-service training, for they fix the formal policies of the agencies and -because such directives are issued infrequently -they signal the importance of their message. Given the inconsistent training on Miranda in California, sheriffs and police chiefs may issue orders simply to clarify the duty of officers within the agency. In light of the recent cases, however, the directives may have at least two other aims. Peevy left open the argument that statements taken pursuant to a policy to violate Miranda should be suppressed for all purposes. 167 Thus, county sheriffs and city police chiefs may issue directives to attempt to defeat claims that evidence should be suppressed for all purposes. And, of course, under Monell v. Department of Social Services,' 68 municipalities may be subject to civil rights liability for having a custom 164. Department Broadcast from Sherman Block, Sheriff, Los Angeles County, to All Personnel 1-2 (Jan. 29, 1998) (on file with author). 167. See People v. Peevy, 953 P.2d 1212 ,1225 -28 (Cal. 1998 ).
436 U.S. 658 (1978).
March 20011 [Vol. 99:1121 or policy that deprives individuals of their civil rights. Directives might be issued to avoid municipal liability. 6 9 Of the twenty sheriffs' and police departments from which I have obtained materials, 7° eleven have issued formal directives telling officers not to question "outside Miranda.... The timing of these directives is revealing. Table 1 , below, summarizes the dates of the first formal order issued by each department in relation to the recent Miranda decisions. Butts appears to have had the greatest influence upon the agencies that have decided to issue formal directives, though in addition to the directives reflected in Table 1 I have included the training bulletins from the Fresno and Shasta Sheriffs' Departments on this list even though they are not, per se, directives from the counties' sheriffs, but are rather from others within the sheriff's departments. The bulletins are phrased in sufficiently clear and mandatory language that they would be taken as orders by the sheriffs' deputies. I have excluded a bulletin from the San Francisco District Attorney to the San Francisco Police Department, which asks that officers be advised to stop questioning upon an invocation. See Memorandum from District Attorney Terence Hallinan to Police Legal Affairs (July 17, 2000) (on file with author). The bulletin was distributed to investigators and possibly others in the police department, but is not viewed as a directive from the department itself. Telephone Conversation with Lt. Henry C. Hunter, San Francisco Police Dep't (Oct. 31, 2000) . The departments that have not issued directives to officers offer a variety of reasons. Some have provided recent in-service training, 174 and may believe that that instruction will suffice. Others indicate that they have never trained officers to question "outside Miranda" and thus do not need to issue specific instructions to discontinue the practice. 75 Prohibition of Interrogations "Outside Miranda" -Decision Affirmed (July 2000) (on file with author); Internal Communication from Sgt. Chuck Lebak, City of Redding, to All Sworn Personnel (July 26, 2000) (on file with author); see also Memorandum from District Attorney Terence Hallinan to Police Legal Affairs, supra note 171 (characterizing Dickerson as settling unequivocally whether questioning "outside Miranda" is permissible, and asking San Francisco Police Department to advise officers not to interrogate over an invocation); Special Order No. 00-S-160 from Edward J. Chavez, Chief, Stockton Police Dep't, to All Personnel, supra note 171 (noting that "the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed the Miranda decision in a Virginia case, and let stand a California case that said officers could be personally liable for deliberately trampling Miranda rights").
D. Summary
Though statewide training is not uniform, it has generally changed in the wake of the recent Miranda decisions. After the Ninth Circuit's rulings in Henry and Butts, both POST and the Attorney General's Office softened their positions. POST issued seemingly contradictory videotapes: one tells officers not to question in violation of Miranda; the other reports on Butts and gives the decision a narrow interpretation, implying that it is permissible for officers to question "outside Miranda" so long as they do so carefully. POST has not broadcast any videos on the Supreme Court's opinion in Dickerson, though it reported the Fourth Circuit's ruling. After the Supreme Court decided Dickerson (and denied certiorari in Butts), however, the written training from POST, the Attorney General and law enforcement organizations has generally come to counsel adherence to Miranda, with a potentially enormous hiccup: POST has told instructors that impeachment exception "procedures" are a matter of local policy. Future researchers may wish to study the impact of POST's equivocation upon law enforcement officers in California.
There are significant differences at the county and local level as well. Some law enforcement agencies have directed officers not to question "outside Miranda." Other agencies may teach police about the recent decisions or simply expect officers to learn about the rulings in off-site courses.
One of the most striking aspects of the training materials is simply how little changed after the California Supreme Court declared in Peevy that questioning "outside Miranda" is "illegal" and "misconduct" and that Miranda and Edwards impose affirmative duties upon officers. POST and the Attorney General's Office acknowledged but failed to respect the justices' ruling. Neither agency made any effort to halt the practice of questioning "outside Miranda." County prosecutors have seemed more willing to instruct their staff and local police to follow Peevy and not question in violation of Miranda. With respect to county sheriffs and local police, apart from one exception,' 76 local agencies did not appear to direct officers to cease questioning "outside Miranda" until after the Ninth Circuit held in Butts that police officers "who intentionally violate the rights protected by Miranda must expect to have to defend themselves in civil actions."' 77 The ruling in Dickerson seems to have reaffirmed this new instruction by undercut-176. The one exception is the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
177. Cal. Att'ys for Crim. Justice v. Butts, 195 F.3d 1039 , 1050 (9th Cir. 1999 . The sample of county sheriffs and police departments is, however, quite small and it is difficult to state this result as more than one researcher's impression. ting any argument that Miranda's procedures are nonconstitutional and merely optional.
There are several troubling explanations for the general malaise after Peevy. One is that law enforcement officials felt free to disregard Peevy's normative statements because they were not backed with significant sanctions. Another is that law enforcement officials disagreed with the opinion and were simply waiting for a final ruling from the United States Supreme Court. 7 8 The second explanation is disturbing because Peevy is a decision from the state's highest court, which routinely decides constitutional questions. If officials disagreed with the ruling, they could have counseled officers to adhere to Miranda and Peevy pending a decision from the U.S. Supreme Court. By and large, however, officials cited the portion of Peevy that advantaged police and ignored the part of Peevy that did not.' 79 Nor did officials issue new training materials after the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Peevy.
Finally, another striking aspect of the training materials is simply that they vary so much. Perhaps this should not be surprising. County district attorneys and sheriffs are elected. Police chiefs are appointed by local officials. Trainers are, in turn, selected by managers within their respective law enforcement agencies. The culture of each agency may vary depending upon such factors as leadership from the top, custom, local crime rates, law enforcement identity with the community and resources. The variance in training appears to be a function of lo- For decades, scholars have debated the virtues and vices of shaping police behavior through exclusionary rules. In an insightful recent article, Sharon Davies approaches the issue from another perspective. Davies explains that an exclusionary rule may, in theory, represent either a "price" -a penalty that permits an officer to choose to cause harm provided that she internalizes the costs -or a "sanction" -a penalty that is attached to conduct that society considers morally wrong and seeks to prevent.' 8 2 Some of the training materials that encourage police to question "outside Miranda" expressly characterize Miranda's exclusionary rule as a value-neutral pricing scheme.' 83 This 180. See, e.g., Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 151 (1990) ("The merit of the Edwards decision lies in the clarity of its command and the certainty of its application."); Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 681 (1988) One possibility is that officers may be induced to follow Miranda by the fear that deliberate questioning "outside Miranda" may lead to an involuntary statement. Officers who violate Miranda and obtain a statement that is later ruled involuntary may jeopardize a prosecution because the statement and, likely, its fruits will be inadmissible for any Miranda. " It simply has an evidentiary consequence -a "price" -that may be internalized by prosecutors and police. See, e.g., SOURCEBOOK, supra note 21, § 7.48b (Rev. July 1998) ("[I]f you fail to comply with the Miranda guidelines in a non-coercive way, although any statement you obtain will be inadmissible at trial to prove guilt (i.e., in the prosecution's 'case-in-chief'), that is the only 'penalty.' "); SOURCEBOOK, supra note 21, § 7.40b (Rev. Mar. 1997) ("[Tlhe Miranda decision is not a code of conduct setting forth how police must conduct their investigations in the field."); Videotape, supra note 21, transcript reprinted in Weisselberg, supra note 3, at 191 ("[Miranda is] a court-created decision that affects the admissibility of testimonial evidence and that's all it is .... The only consequence of your talking to somebody who has invoked his rights is we will not be able to use his statement in the case in chief in trial against him.").
184. As Davies explains, there is a sharp discontinuity in liability when a sanctioning penalty is in place. Actors nearing the line separating permissible and forbidden conduct will not balance costs and benefits in the margin, but will tend to conform to the rule. 
186.
Applying Davies' theory, it may be that Miranda's legal obligation is not backed by a sufficiently strong penalty to gain the incentive effects of characterizing the exclusionary rule as a sanction instead of a price. If the sanction is not strong, actors nearing the line between permissible and impermissible conduct will not be deterred from simply balancing their own costs and benefits in the margin. purpose.' 87 For this to prove a realistic deterrent, however, courts would have to be willing to find involuntariness far more frequently than at present. In Henry v. Kernan, the Ninth Circuit seemed to understand the powerful psychological impact of questioning over a Miranda invocation, telling a suspect that he can have an attorney and then affirmatively denying the request for one. 8 8 But unless many other courts find statements involuntary on similar facts, this will be unlikely to alter the way that many officers conduct stationhouse interrogations. Indeed, law enforcement training was not substantially modified after the court of appeals decided Henry.
A more plausible candidate for change agent is 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As we have seen, the ruling in Butts appears to have prompted many state and local officials to alter their training. Even so, it is difficult to conclude that the risk of civil rights liability -or more precisely, police training about the risk of civil rights liability -can alone transform interrogation practices. Few suspects who are questioned "outside Miranda" are likely to sue police; the suspects rarely will be sympathetic plaintiffs, and the amount of damages will probably be small. " ' 89 Further, departments will most likely indemnify the defendant officers, making the possibility of financial loss for any individual officer quite slim. The risk of § 1983 liability, however, is much more apt to alter police behavior in the stationhouse if it encourages sheriffs, police chiefs, and department supervisors to follow Miranda (perhaps in an effort to avoid municipal liability, the cost of defending lawsuits, or humiliation), and if these leaders endeavor to make compliance with Miranda a departmental norm.
Training is not likely to change longstanding interrogation practices within a law enforcement agency without substantial reinforcement, particularly if officers understand that courts will still allow limited use of an "outside Miranda" statement. If supervisors wish to imbue respect for Miranda, they must themselves take Miranda seriously and signal that they prefer their officers to honor an invocation, even when doing so means losing an opportunity to gain useful information or evidence. And the message must be reinforced, if necessary, through discipline of errant officers. The risk of §1983 liability may influence conduct within a department, but ultimately a change in culture must be brought on by police themselves. 188. See 197 F.3d 1021 , 1028 (9th Cir. 1999 ) (noting that the officer "took unfair advantages" of the compelling pressures inherent in a custodial interrogation, and that "[any minimally trained police officer should have known such pressure was improper and likely to produce involuntary statements"). JUSTICE 1950 JUSTICE -1990 JUSTICE at 152-53 (1993 (describing how agency officials develop their own group norms about how things should be done, which are highly resistant to externally imposed changes).
196. In addition to police training, other important parts of the change in departmental norms included: greater involvement of prosecutors with police; increased visibility of police practices; police managers' acceptance of legal norms as a mechanism for controlling line officers; and use of suppression hearings to reinforce police appreciation for legal procedures. See Simon & Skolnick, supra note 194, [80] [81] [82] [83] [84] [85] . See Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Comment, The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence: An Empirical Study of Chicago Narcotics Officers, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1016 REV. , 1049 REV. n.128 (1987 . The question was whether the respondents knew of any case in which a judge has "disbelieved police testimony at a suppression hearing." Id. A subsequent question asked how of-cently, Orfield surveyed judges, prosecutors and public defenders in Chicago. He reported that judges and public defenders believe that perjury is the major factor limiting the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule. 1 9s Further, 38% of his respondents think that police supervisors encourage perjury, and 67% of respondents believe that supervisors tolerate perjury. 1 99 These reports confirm that culture and leadership do matter.
If improper interrogation practices will not end without a change in departmental culture, direction from the top is particularly important. It is significant that a number of agency heads issued orders after Butts, instructing officers not to question "outside Miranda." Whether these orders actually become norms internalized by detectives and supervisors who work in the stationhouse will depend upon continuing training and reinforcement at all levels of the agency.
Finally, one might explore whether it is possible to determine the impact of Dickerson apart from Butts. Dickerson confirms the view, expressed in Butts, that Miranda imposes affirmative obligations. Several agencies have instructed officers to comply with Miranda after Dickerson. And, certainly, Butts would not remain on the books had Dickerson come out the other way. Yet the language of many of the training materials leaves the strong impression that, but for the possibility of civil liability, training would not have changed.
B. Section 1983 Litigation After Dickerson
If it is true that the prospect of civil rights liability significantly encourages police to comply with Miranda's commands, we should ask whether Dickerson will facilitate this use of the civil rights laws.
Prior to Dickerson, most courts rejected efforts to assess liability for Miranda violations under the federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute establishes a cause of action for state actors who deprive people of rights "secured by the Constitution and laws." 2 " As Susan Klein and others explain, the Supreme Court's characterization of Miranda as "prophylactic" -arguably "nonconstitutional" -has been a main obstacle to using the civil rights law to enforce Miranda; 1 the federal courts have generally ruled that the failure to administer Miranda warnings or honor an invocation of the right to counsel is not itself cognizable under § 1983. 202 Another obstacle has been the position taken by several circuits that a Fifth Amendment violation occurs only after a statement is introduced in court. 2 " 3 This would limit the utility of §1983 by restricting its application to cases where an accused was questioned in violation of Miranda and was subsequently indicted or tried.
Dickerson may well lead courts to revisit the first (though not the second) of these obstacles to civil rights liability. Dickerson acknowl-There is another useful way of, thinking about Miranda and § 1983, however. While the courts of appeals have thus far not been kind to the claim that Miranda violations standing alone are cognizable under § 1983, most would agree that officers and cities may be sued for using coercion to obtain a statement. Yet a failure to advise a suspect of the right to remain silent or to speak with a lawyer has long been held to be probative of actual coercion. In Davis v. North' Carolina, the Court ruled a confession involuntary under the Fourteenth Amendment, stating:
[T]hat a defendant was not advised of his right to remain silent or of his right respecting counsel at the outset of interrogation, as is now required by Miranda, is a significant factor in considering the voluntariness of statements later made. This factor has been recognized in several of our prior decisions dealing with standards of voluntariness. Thus, the fact that Davis was never effectively advised of his rights gives added weight to the other circumstances described below which made his confessions involuntary.
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In Butts, the Ninth Circuit found that the failure to comply with Miranda may be a significant part of a civil rights plaintiff's proof of coercion, and that officers who deliberately question "outside Miranda" are not entitled to qualified immunity. 214 By reaffirming the connection between Miranda and the Constitution, Dickerson strengthens these conclusions. After Butts and Dickerson, it should be much easier for a civil rights plaintiff to get to trial if she was questioned in violation of Miranda and there is at least some additional evidence tending to show coercion. The plaintiff should be able to avoid summary judgment -a Miranda violation should, standing alone, establish at least a genuine issue of material fact 215 as to actual coercion -the ultimate question of actual coercion should go to the jury, and the defendant officers should be denied qualified immunity. For this reason, Butts and Dickerson together substantially increase the threat of civil liability (or, certainly, the threat of costly litigation) for officers and departments that continue to question "outside Miranda." One hopes that this increased threat will be instrumental in encouraging police chiefs, sheriffs, and supervisors to change departmental norms. CONCLUSION 
Dickerson v. United States left
Miranda standing, but with all of the exceptions and modifications that have been crafted during the last thirty-five years. As we have seen, Miranda's exclusionary rule does not give officers much of an incentive to cease questioning a suspect who invokes the right to counsel or the right to remain silent. Officers who comply will gain no further information. On the other hand, interrogators who continue to question may obtain statements useful for impeachment and they may learn about additional evidence or witnesses. For these reasons, police in California (and perhaps elsewhere) have developed the practice of questioning "outside Miranda."
This Article explores whether Dickerson and other recent Miranda decisions may bring an end to this practice. An examination of statewide and local police training materials shows that the risk of civil liability appears to be at least as significant as Dickerson in leading police agencies to instruct personnel to comply with Miranda. Miranda's exclusionary rule, even after Dickerson, remains so weak that law enforcement agencies need the additional incentive of the threat of civil rights liability to follow Miranda's procedures. Dickerson is, nevertheless, important because it confirms Miranda's constitutional foundation and may enhance the ability of civil rights plaintiffs to deter deliberate violations of Miranda.
Whether the practice of questioning "outside Miranda" will actually cease in California remains to be seen. Legislative efforts to end the practice have not yet proved successful. Training is necessary but not sufficient to lead officers to comply with Miranda. Miranda remains on the law books. Whether it will survive in the stationhouse will depend upon the inclination of sheriffs, police chiefs and supervisory personnel to make compliance with Miranda the norm in their departments. That inclination may be nourished by the palpable threat of § 1983 liability but, whatever its source, it must ultimately come 215. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c) ("The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings... show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.").
Please note that I am not seeking copies of any police reports or motions or briefs in any individual cases. I am not seeking to obtain any reports of any individual interrogations. Rather, I am only seeking to determine, broadly, how sworn personnel have been trained in light of these decisions.
I request that you determine whether you will comply with this request within ten days, as required by Cal. Gov. Code §6253. Please tell me whether there is any copying fee for these materials, and I will promptly provide payment. Finally, should you determine not to make all of the requested documents available, I request that you indicate which items you will not turn over for inspection and specify the reasons for refusal to comply with this request, pursuant to Cal. Gov. Code §6255.
Thank you very much for your assistance. 217. Population data are from the U.S. Census Bureau and are available at http://factfinder/census.gov (last visited Apr. 20, 2001 ).
